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Net gains
The Voting Rights Act and Southern local government
RICHARD M. VALELLY

The Supreme Court—or more precisely, its regular majority in votingrights cases (comprising Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia,
and Thomas)—is clearly worried about the impact of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 on state and local government^ Supreme Court decisions
such as Shaw v. Reno (1993), Miller v. Johnson (1995), Abrams et al. v.
Johnson et al. (1997) and Reno, Attorney General v. Bossier Parish
School Board etal. (1997) reveal (1) overt suspicion of the Department of
Justice, (2) a preference for restricting the department’s role in votingrights policymaking, (3) considerable trust in the capacity of the federal
courts to guide this policy domain reasonably well, and (4) a desire to di
minish the “federalism costs” (to use Court language) of national regula
tory oversight of local governmental election practices.
Taking my cue from Albert O. Hirschman’s widely known depiction of
unnecessary pessimism in modern policy analysis, I argue that the
Supreme Court’s majority has misconstrued the “federalism costs” of the
Voting Rights Act and its administration and implementation by the Jus
tice Department. What has happened with Southern local government is
most assuredly not, I argue, a case of “jeopardy”: of seemingly progres
sive reform posing threats to existing values and rights.^*
* For valuable help and encouragement I thank the volume’s editor, Martha Derthick. The
Woodrow Wilson Center graciously awarded me a guest scholarship in the summer of
1994, which enabled me to draft this chapter’s earliest incarnation. Colin Apse, then on
the Wilson Center’s staff, provided excellent research assistance that summer. More re
cently, Peyton McCrary, of the Voting Section of the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division, was very generous with his knowledge and time, reading and closely
commenting on several drafts. None of the above is liable in any way for any errors of
fact, interpretation, or emphasis—everything I say here is my responsibility alone.
^ See Albert O. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (Cam
bridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991), on the origins of the
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The Court and the conservatives are not wrong to worry about “feder
alism costs.” A large majority of the American public has strong confi
dence in local government, in contrast to the minority support now en
joyed by the federal government among the public.^ Happily for this
majority, what has happened in locally implementing the Voting Rights
Act does not contradict the value attached by the American public to
American local government; instead, it supports it. The gains in the South
to what local government is about, and to the values it serves, have been
substantial as a result of the process that evolved during the 1970s and
1980s.
For more than half a century, most local government in the South was
“captured” government in the sense that it was disproportionately re
sponsive to the partial interests of powerful local whites. A regional sys
tem of loosely organized one-party politics, based on white supremacist
solidarity, had fundamental consequences for local government. V. O.
Key, Jr., communicated these consequences well in his classic study.
Southern Politics:
A loosely organized politics with no stable centers of power or leadership for an
entire state is in one sense admirably suited for dealing with the Negro question.
A pulverized politics decentralizes power to county leaders and county officials
and in some areas devolution is carried even further in that public officials do not
cross the plantation boundary without invitation. ... In a granulated political
structure of this kind with thousands of points of authority there is no point at
which accountability can be enforced.'*

Local government in a fundamental sense was not public, impersonal,
and impartial. The Voting Rights Act has helped to rebrighten the local
line between the public and the private, and this has resulted in a more de
sirable framework for each citizen’s experience of membership in the lo
cal political community.^ Certainly the price of that rebrightening has
bias for pessimism in policy analysis. See also Hirschman, “The Rhetoric of Reform,” The
American Prospect (Summer 1993): 148-52.
^ See Philadelphia Inquirer, “The Public’s View of Federal Powers,” inset to Steven Thomas,
“Reassertion of Federal Role Shifts Power Back to Where It Always Was” (October 12,
1997); page E-3 shows (on the basis of a poll for the Pew Research Center for the People
8c the Press) that 65 percent of the public has confidence in city and local government, 61
percent in state government, and 48 percent in the federal government.
'* V. O. Key, Jr., with the assistance of Alexander Heard, Southern Politics in State and Na
tion (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984 [Knopf, 1949]), 307, note 9.
^ On the “citizenship impact” of policies, see Public Policy for Democracy, ed. Helen In
gram and Steven Rathgeb Smith (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993).
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been some loss of local autonomy from national influences. But on bal
ance it is a fair price.
Whether it has in fact been a fair price occasions strong disagreement
though. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 might seem instead to have weak
ened Southern grass-roots democracy, and thus to have enervated citizen
ship at the local level. Southern local officials do not have sole custody, af
ter all, of one of the most vital aspects of local self-government, that is,
deciding what the electoral rules are. The Voting Rights Act has meant
that successive congressional majorities, federal judges, a professional
voting-rights bar, and the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department
have all become key players in local voting-rights policy.
However, in doing this (goes the case against the local effects of the
Voting Rights Act’s administration and implementation), these players
have also perpetuated racial divisions by forcing local processes and out
comes into a Procrustean bed of racialized categories subject to federal
proscription. Furthermore, the partial loss of local custody of electoralpolicy decisions has been largely to private actors, who have not hesitated
to push beyond the legislative intent of 1965. Such organizations as the
ACLU’s Voting Rights Project, Common Cause, the Lawyers’ Committee
for Civil Rights under Law, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights,
and the NAACP-Legal Defense Fund, among others—not to mention the
large foundations that aid their work—have in fact been critically impor
tant protagonists in the voting-rights policy domain. Through their mon
itoring of Southern local governmental decisions about electoral rules,
voting-rights policy has shifted away from remedying impediments to the
physical act of voting and toward questions about whether black voters
can elect as many black public officials as they should be electing. The
politics of black voting rights has therefore been about making black bal
lots count. There is nothing wrong with that per se, but these groups did
not run for office. No one elected them to make public policy.
I call this claim a regulatory-mischief view since it concentrates on how
narrow groups govern a policy domain at the expense of local govern
ment and the broader values it serves. Section I following describes this
regulatory-mischief view in greater detail. The optimistic view ultimately
propounded here becomes clearer through first describing its alternative.
Section II lays out criticisms of the regulatory-mischief view. Section III
emphasizes the Voting Rights Act’s renewal of local government (this is
where my optimistic case comes in). Section IV briefly concludes my con
tribution.
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I: BUILDING FACTION IN? THE REGULATORY-MISCHIEF VIEW

Any “federalism-costs” case against the Voting Rights Act’s administra
tion and implementation runs up against the fact that with the Fifteenth
Amendment the American people made an exception to whatever value
they attach to local government. They did so in the weightiest and most
conspicuous way provided by our polity’s procedures. Nor were the peo
ple specific about how to enforce the amendment; the particular form of
enforcement was left up to Congress.^
Still, it would be hard to argue that the people authorized rampant in
terest-group liberalism as the mechanism of “delocalization.” Critics of
voting rights politics have charged that liberal interest groups—recogniz
ing the potency of Section 5—have hijacked the Voting Rights Act.^ Be
cause Section 5 requires local jurisdictions to “pre-dear” rules changes
with the Department of Justice, voting-rights groups can enter into the
regulatory process at the national level.® Critics have also found the 1982
amendments to the act, as well as a 1986 Supreme Court decision inter
preting them, disturbing. In 1982 Congress strengthened the act to estab
lish a tighter relationship between black voting and black officeholding.
The Court’s 1986 decision, Thornburg v. Gingles, simplified the fact-find
ing process for litigation under the amendment (known as Section 2 litiga
tion). Again, interest groups were both sponsors and beneficiaries of these
changes. They could now methodically pick off the many local jurisdic
tions that lacked black officeholders. By the 1980s, goes the case against
the Voting Rights Act’s local effects, interest groups effectively enveloped
* Political scientists, of course, have abandoned serious analytical use of the term “the peo
ple,” but I use it here as a reminder of the special nature of democratic constitutionalism.
The best brief introduction to the Fifteenth Amendment’s origins is David E. Kyvig, Ex
plicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the US. Constitution, 1776-1995 (Lawrence: Uni
versity Press of Kansas, 1996), 176-82.
^ My characterization represents a sharpening of themes in Timothy G. O’Rourke, “The
1982 Amendments and the Voting Rights Paradox,” and Hugh Davis Graham, “Voting
Rights and the American Regulatory State,” in Grofman and Davidson, Controversies in
Minority Voting, 84-113 and 177-96. The basic work that launched critical assessment
of the Voting Rights Act’s evolution, and several scholarly responses, is Abigail M. Thernstrom. Whose Votes Count? Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights (Cambridge,
Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1987, for the Twentieth Century Fund). See also
Stephan Thernstrom and Abigail Thernstrom, America in Black and White: One Nation,
Indivisible (New York: Simon Sc Schuster, 1997), chap. 16; Raymond Wolters, Right
Turn: William Bradford Reynolds, the Reagan Administration, and Black Civil Rights
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1996), chaps. 1-7.
* There is anecdotal evidence of group involvement in rule-making; see, for instance. Drew
S. Days III, “Section 5 Enforcement and the Department of Justice,” in Grofman and
Davidson, Controversies in Minority Voting, 52-65, esp. 61-3.
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local processes of making basic decisions about electoral rules within a
central system of oversight and correction in which they predominated.
The evil said to follow from such expanded group influence is a lack of
open debate (except for periodic congressional scrutiny) about how best
to realize the aims of the Voting Rights Act. Absent the correcting influ
ence of open public debate, a misunderstanding of democratic process has
in turn emerged among such liberal groups as the ACLU’s Voting Rights
Project, Common Cause, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and the NAACP-Legal
Defense Fund. For instance, about a decade ago liberal voting-rights
groups pushed for safe districting, that is, the idea that minority office
holding depended on creating legislative districts with a population at
least 65 percent hlack. (This level was chosen because black voter regis
tration and turnout have historically lagged behind white levels.) Critics
suggested that this remedy misconceived the requirements of political
equality. Equality does not mean guaranteed outcomes. The proper reme
dies for the losers in democratic majoritarian politics are inventive forms
of coalition-building and public discussion.
II: LIMITS OF THE REGULATORY-MISCHIEF VIEW

The regulatory-mischief view thus holds that the Voting Rights Act’s pol
itics has become an interest-driven subgovernment—a voting-rights ver
sion of the way that, for instance, environmental policy is made within a
system of interest groups, regulatory rule-making, and congressional
committees.^ Any responsible student of democratic politics will recog
nize that, if true, this would be a serious matter. Yet in key ways, the reg
ulatory-mischief view misdescribes fundamental relationships among the
Voting Rights Act, the politics of the act, and Southern local government.
Let me turn first to legal mobilization. Legal mobilization has three key
elements: (1) an effort to win policy change in the courts, (2) an empow
ering and politicizing effect among the first-order beneficiaries of such
policy change, and (3) a broadly educative effect on other institutions and
actors, for example Congress or former political opponents.^® In focusing
^ On subgovernment, see Bryan D. Jones, Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic
Politics: Attention, Choice, and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1994), chap. 7.
The term “legal mobilization” I borrow from Michael W. McCann, Rights at Work: Pay
Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1994), esp. 5-12. McCann emphasizes the first two elements of ray definition.
From Gerald Rosenberg’s discussion of the relative efficacy of group litigation I have bor
rowed the third element. V. Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring
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on the emergence of legal mobilization in the post-1965 period, vital dis
tinctions between the legal-mobilization account and the regulatorymischief view will emerge. The regulatory-mischief view implies the exis
tence of a dominant coalition of lawyers and black activists using a
path-breaking law to establish a bureaucratic receivership of local gov
ernments, all the while deploying rights talk.^i Legal mobilization, by
contrast, implies that post-1965 events formed a new and often arduous
phase in a long struggle to widen the inclusiveness of the American polity.
Legal mobilization for officeholding^^

The regulatory-mischief view says little about the resistance of white
Democratic party politicians, but such foot-dragging was pervasive for at
least a decade and a half after the Voting Rights Act. After 1965, white
Southern officials sought to dilute the ballot. Reading the handwriting
on the walls, many Southern state legislatures quietly but quickly recast
local government with such devices as requiring local governments to
adopt at-large voting. Blacks could vote, but few would hold office.
Such resistance to the Voting Rights Act transformed Southern local
government into a battleground—and small wonder. The local and state
offices sealed off by state legislators exercised important responsibilities.
In Mississippi, for instance, county boards of supervisors levy county tax
es, decide how to spend county money, direct bridge and road construc
tion and maintenance, and appoint such boards as the welfare and plan
ning boards. Until 1975, they also drew up jury lists for the state courts.
About Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), esp. 25-6 discussing
“extra-judicial” effects. Rosenberg, incidentally, is skeptical that legal mobilization is as
effective as contentious collective action in winning policy and political change.
” The term “rights talk” was coined by Mary Ann Glendon in her book. Rights Talk: The
Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: Free Press, 1991). For a judicious in
troduction to the proposition that there are pluses and minuses to rights claims in politics
and policy, see Marc Tandy, “Public Policy and Citizenship,” in Ingram and Smith, Pub
lic Policy for Democracy, 19-44, esp. 27-31.
A lucid—indeed, gripping—study of the “legal-mobilization” response to white legisla
tive resistance is Parker, Black Votes Count. Less readable but definitive and equally full
of surprises is Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act,
1965-1990, ed. Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman (Princeton: Princeton Univer
sity Press, 1994), chaps. 2-9. This account is based on these sources.
Chandler Davidson defines vote dilution as “a process whereby election laws or prac
tices, either singly or in concert, combine with systematic bloc voting among an identifi
able group to diminish the voting strength of at least one other group. Ethnic or racial mi
nority vote dilution is a special case, in which the voting strength of an ethnic or racial
minority group is diminished or canceled out by the bloc vote of the majority.” Chandler
Davidson, “Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview,” in Minority Vote Dilution, ed. Chan
dler Davidson (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1984), 4.
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Other self-evidently vital elective offices are the county school board and
the county elections superintendent.
Indeed, this legislative movement to recast local government forms
part of a larger pattern. Reading the legislative and political histories of
the 1957, 1960, and 1964 Civil Rights Acts and the 1965 Voting Rights
Act would reveal a detailed inventory of state and local efforts to resist
implementation of the Fifteenth Amendment.
The major “reforms” included: (1) requiring or permitting county and
municipal governments to substitute at-large voting for public office for
district-based voting; (2) requiring or permitting these governments to es
tablish majority-voting requirements for public office, thus preventing
plurality black victory over a field of split white candidates; (3) convert
ing elective offices to offices appointed by officials likely to have exclu
sively white support; and (4) reapportioning of local district lines to cre
ate white-majority voting districts.
Black out-migration from the South between the 1930s and 1950s had
drained political jurisdictions of many potential voters. Thus these lay
ered changes were quite effective responses to both the increased black
voter registration from 1944 on and the sharp jump in black voter regis
tration produced by the Voting Rights Act. They also blunted the poten
tial impact of growing urban black concentrations on city officeholding.
What responses were available to civil-rights leaders? No two-party
system exercised a check on those who pressed for these legislative re
forms, nor was another eruption of sustained protest comparable to the
heyday of civil-rights activity from 1961 to 1965 likely. Fortuitously,
though, official white resistance in Deep South states during the 1961-64
period attracted a new political resource: experienced white and black
non-Southern lawyers willing and able to work with local black and
white political activists and lawyers.
See David J. Garrow, Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 6-132. From Reconstruction until
the present, white conservatives have developed many ways to resist black electoral in
volvement. The list includes but is not restricted to (1) private violence (hence the Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1870); (2) private violence under the color of law (proscribed by the Ku
Klux Klan Act, which in turn formed the basis for federal prosecutions of, for instance,
the Neshoba County [Mississippi] law-enforcement officers who conspired to murder
three civil-rights activists in the summer of 1964); (3) movement building (e.g., the Citi
zens Council movement that began in 1956); (4) electoral mobilization (e.g., the States’
Rights Party of 1948); (5) litigation (e.g.. South Carolina’s suit challenging the constitu
tionality of the Voting Rights Act); (6) constitution-writing (e.g., the Mississippi Consti
tution of 1890); (7) reforms of legal-electoral structures (e.g., the establishment of white
primaries); and (8) judicial and bureaucratic obstructionism (e.g., great delay in the fed
eral district courts of Alabama and Mississippi during the early 1960s after legal motions
of the United States on behalf of black voters).
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The elements of the legal mobilization that eventually emerged were
laid in Washington, D.C., and in Mississippi during the summer of 1963
and the Freedom Summer of 1964. During a ^JC^hite Flouse meeting
with officials of the American Bar Association and the National Bar As
sociation in 1963, President John F. Kennedy urged the formation of a
volunteer legal effort in the South; this in turn led to the establishment of
the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights under Law (LCCR) and the
LCCR’s invitation to Mississippi by the National Council of Churches.
Also, about 130 volunteer lawyers donated vacation time during Free
dom Summer under the auspices of the Lawyers’ Constitutional Defense
Committee (LCDC), a consortium of legal officers from the Congress of
Racial Equality, the American Civil Liberties Union, the NAACP-Legal
Defense Fund, the American Jewish Congress, and the National Council
of Churches.
Initially, volunteer lawyers handled the criminal cases of civil-rights
workers facing local and state criminal prosecutions, but they quickly
shifted into affirmative, as opposed to reactive, kinds of legal actions.
They turned toward challenging antipicketing statutes and, more impor
tant, voting-rights denials. The parent organizations also opened up per
manent staff offices in the black business district of Jackson.
Then, in the wake of the Mississippi legislature’s thorough effort in
1966 to cordon off officeholding from black politicians, the tiny liberal
wing of the Mississippi Democratic party and the larger independent par
ty, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP), forged an alliance
with LCCR, LCDC, and NAACP-Legal Defense Fund lawyers in Missis
sippi. Together they focused on responding to the legislature’s burst of
electoral reform through 1) acquiring major foundation support to pro
vide a long-run material base and 2) launching Section 5 voting-rights
litigation. In doing so, they provided a model for similar combinations
in Alabama and Georgia; they also reinforced a long-standing inter
est in combining electoral mobilization with litigation among AfricanAmerican and Mexican-American organizations in Texas and other
Southwestern states.
By 1969, legal mobilization led to a critically important Supreme
Court decision, Allen v. State Board of Elections, which held that such di
lutive devices as at-large plans and majority-vote requirements required
clearance from the Justice Department under Section 5 before they be
came legally effective. As shown in Table 10.1, legal mobilization was
On the Southwest, see Amy Bridges, Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the South
west (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

Event

Allen v. 6Board of Elections

Renewal ofVRA to 1975

White v. Regester

Renewal of VRA to 1982, and
amendment

Date

1969

1970

1973

1975

The Supreme Court holds that Congress intended for the VRA to have "the broadest
possible scope." Vote dilution as well as
vote denial are proscribed. Challenges to
local rules changes for failure to obtain
Section 5 pre-clearance do not require constitutional argument.
Congress in effect says that the decision in
Allen articulated congressional intent.
Supreme Court delineates wide range of circumstances that will raise an "inference of
intent" (and thus be sufficient to show intent) to deny minorities equal opportunity
"to participate in the political process and
to elect legislators of their choice."
Jurisdictions losing in court required to pay
plaintiffs' costs and attorneys' fees.

Description

Table 10.1. Evolution of legal mobilization

Potential incentive for jurisdictions to settle
with voting rights groups and plaintiffs,
reducing strain on resources of voting
rights legal activists.

Fact-finding in legal mobilization becomes
more complex in exchange for what is in
effect a "results" standard for showing
vote dilution.

Legal mobilization can continue.

Sharp increase in number of rules changes
submitted to the Department of Justice
for Section 5 pre-clearance from local and
state jurisdictions "covered" by the Voting Rights Act.

Effects on voting rights activists' strategies
and resources, and on perceptions and behavior of white local officials

Thornburg v. Gingles

1986
Supreme Court simplifies factual tests for
proof of racial bloc voting among whites
sufficient to cause vote dilution.

Court holds that plaintiffs must directly prove intent to discriminate, vitiating Allen and White.
Congress extends pre-clearance for 25 years.
Amends Section 2 of the VRA to prohibit
rules that have dilutive effects regardless of
intent.
Supreme Court accepts congressional correction in a case with facts very similar to
City of Mobile v. Bolden.
Number of voting rights cases in federal
courts increases. Number of jurisdictions
removing dilutive rules more than doubles. Threat of lawsuits found by Atlanta
Constitution survey of local Georgia officials to motivate switches to district elections.
Continued correction of electoral rules and
of lines of election jurisdictions.

Potential for reversal of gains from legal
mobilization. Voting rights groups turn to
Congress.
Potential for Court reversal of City of
Mobile v. Bolden.

Sources: Laughlin McDonald, "The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and Minority Representation" in Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson, eds., Controversies in Minority Voting (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution Press, 1992); Frank Parker, Black Votes Count (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990).

Rogers v. Lodge

Congressional renewal and
amendment of VRA

City of Mobile v. Bolden

1982

1982

1980
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rather successful from then on. Not until 1980 did legal activists experi
ence a severe crisis in the development of voting-rights law. They then
turned to Congress and argued successfully for an amendment of the Vot
ing Rights Act that would correct the Court’s sudden abandonment of es
tablished principles favoring legal mobilization. In the decade following
the 1982 congressional amendment of the Voting Rights Act, the
Supreme Court played a key support role in legal mobilization (though
now, of course, it no longer does).^^
To put the story another way, it was a long, uncertain struggle. The
original networks of legal activists had their hands full; only gradually
have new networks in other states emerged. Gaining reasonably full com
pliance with Allen v. State Board of Elections at the state and local level
took approximately ten years of follow-on litigation. Second, dilutive
changes that preceded the Voting Rights Act were not covered by Allen;
these have required separate litigation under the 1982 amendment to Sec
tion 2 of the act. Third, not until the mid- to late 1970s and early 1980s
did local associations pushing for legal mobilization emerge in South Car
olina and parts of North Carolina, and not until the early 1980s could
one really find them in Virginia.
Fourth, as Table 10.2 shows, substantial rates of local black office
holding in states under complete VRA coverage are recent—within the
last decade or so. (North Carolina is not listed because only part of it is
under VRA coverage.) As one would expect from a legal-mobilization
framework, the table suggests both (1) considerable delay in the emer
gence of significant levels of local black officeholding and (2) considerable
unevenness in VRA-covered states with regard to rates of black office
holding, taking into account the percentage of the total voting-age popu
lation that is black.
Two sets of figures are displayed in Table 10.2. The set on the left (de
noted as [1]) shows figures for certain categories of local officeholders
only—county commissioners, members of municipal governing bodies,
sheriffs, and school-board members. The set on the right (denoted as [2])
shows figures for all local elected officials—including, for instance, coro
ners, municipal sergeants, probate judges, and commissioners of special
boards. The black voting-age population (VAP) as a percentage of the to
tal voting-age population is displayed as a helpful benchmark. One might
** In addition to Parker, Black Votes Count, and Davidson and Grofman, Quiet Revolu
tion, see Laughlin McDonald, “The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and Minority Rep
resentation,” in Grofman and Davidson, Controversies in Minority Voting, 66-84.
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Table 10.2. Change in local officeholding by African-Americans in
Southern states completely covered by the Voting Rights Act

AL (1974)
AL(1984)
AL(1993)
GA (1974)
GA(1984)
GA (1993)
LA (1974)
LA (1984)
LA (1993)
MS (1974)
MS (1984)
MS (1993)
SC (1974)
SC (1984)
SC (1993)
TX(1974)
TX (1984)
TX(1993)
VA (1974)
VA(1984)
VA(1993)

Total
LEO’S
[1]

Total
BLEO’s
[1]

BLEO’s
as %
[1]

All
LEO’S
[2]

All
BLEO’s
[2]

2634
2795
2936
4077
4209
4428
2577
2651
3235
2252
2462
2477
1961
1817
2213
11,467
12,587
12,474
2002
1994
1999

110
241
605
120
250
459
141
374
511
190
296
546
113
229
407
117
183
438
61
86
125

4.2%
8.6%
20.6%
2.9%
5.9%
10.3%
5.5%
14%
15.8%
8.4%
12%
22%
5.8%
12.6%
14.5%
1%
1.5%
3.5%
3%
4.3%
6.2%

N.A.
3125
3237
N.A.
4950
5760
N.A.
2779
3362
N.A.
3226
3241
N.A.
2252
2602
N.A.
18,749
18,636
N.A.
2451
2456

N.A.
292
672
N.A.
276
498
N.A.
425
600
N.A.
410
708
N.A.
242
423
N.A.
215
447
N.A.
100
141

All
BLEO’s
as %
[2]
9%
20%
5.6%
8.6%
15.3%
17.8%
12.7%
21.8%
10.7%
16.2%
1.1%
2.4%
4%
5.7%

Black
VAP
23%
23%
22.7%
22.9%
24%
24.6%
26.6%
27%
27.9%
31.4%
31%
31.6%
26.4%
27%
26.9%
11.3%
11%
11.2%
16.6%
18%
17.6%

expect that over time black local elected officials (BLEOs in the table) as a
percentage of total local elected officials (LEOs in the table) would rise to
ward black VAP (expressed as a percentage of the total VAP). Three
states—Georgia, Texas, and Virginia—stand out for their relative lack of
convergence.^^
By now, a major difference between the regulatory-mischief and legalShowing similar data for other ex-Confederate states, for Oklahoma, and for the Border
States, where obstructions to black voting also emerged, is beyond this chapter’s scope.
These figures are imperfect; several are no more than reasonable estimates. They were de
rived by the author from the census of black elected officials produced by the Joint Cen
ter for Political and Economic Studies (JCPES) in Washington, D.C. It is a testament to
the enduring autonomy of local government that even at this late date in American polit
ical evolution, and after more than two decades of data collection by JCPES, the Roster
is often uncertain as to just how many local governments and local elected officials there
really are. See National Roster of Black Elected Officials, vol. 5 (Washington, D.C: Joint
Center for Political and Economic Studies, July 1975); Black Elected Officials: A Na
tional Roster 1984 (New York: UNIPUB/R. R. Bowker and Company, 1984, for the Joint
Center for Political and Economic Studies); Black Elected Officials: A National Roster
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mobilization views should be clear. The former view suggests a cozy
arrangement for reshaping Southern local government according to cer
tain criteria that would never pass the bar of public debate. But the merit
of the latter is the clarity with which it communicates the point that en
franchisement is not just one struggle—that is, the effort to allow the
physical act of voting. Enfranchisement is at least two struggles. It has
also been about access to the political good of officeholding and the best
ways of constructing such access.
Also, legal mobilization has involved its own kind of public debate. It
is true that courts are not, strictly speaking, deliberative institutions. But
decisions have been made on the basis of careful public argument and the
collection and assessment by courts of a wide range of relevant informa
tion.
Bringing parties into the picture

Let me consider Voting Rights Act politics from another angle—its rela
tionship to national party politics. Political parties always have a basic
stake in how electoral institutions work, because they care about winning
and retaining political offices and controlling representative institutions.
Political-party leaders have preferences in such matters as reapportion
ment, the registration of voters, and how votes are counted. They have to
be brought into any picture of voting-rights politics. Doing so also chal
lenges the basic claims of the regulatory-mischief view.^*
It may not be obvious, but the two major parties have an overlapping
interest in protecting the regulatory framework that the act provides—al
though their interests overlap for different reasons, as we shall see. Nei
ther political party, therefore, seeks deregulation. In this context, groups
and judges easily seem to be the only actors governing the policy domain.
They provide all the movement and action. But in the background are
major but unobtrusive stakeholders in voting-rights policy; the two na
tional parties.
Consider first the Democratic party’s stake in voting rights. The Voting
Rights Act has guaranteed the participation of an African-American con
stituency very loyal to the Democratic party, helping the Democratic par1993 (Washington, D.C.; Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies Press, 1993, by
arrangement with University Press of America).
** On theory and evidence regarding parties having preferences over electoral institutional
design, cf. Richard M. Valelly, “National Parties and Disfranchisement,” in Classifying
by Race, ed. Paul E. Peterson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 188-216.
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ty build biracial voter coalitions in the South. Although Republicans have
dominated presidential elections since the 1960s, in large part because of
growing strength among conservative Southern whites, Democrats have
twice been able to use their strength in the South to gain unified govern
ment. This record contrasts with that of the Republican party, which has
not gained unified government in more than four decades. Electoral regu
lation of the South has thus proved critical in giving Democrats windows
of opportunity for major policy change—openings that they squandered,
yes, but windows as wide as the “Reagan window” of 1981-3.*^
As for the Republican party, the Voting Rights Act does not impede it.
Instead, the act provides a framework for party-building in a region
where the Republican party was weak—and associated with the putative
ills of Reconstruction—for several decades. By completing the entry of
black Southerners into electoral politics, the act created a crucial opening
for Republicans to develop strength in the region. White Southerners
have more conservative policy preferences than black Southerners. Yet
the entry of black Southerners into electoral politics drove Southern
Democrats to become substantially more liberal in their policy stances,
affording Republicans the chance to build partisan attachments among
white Southerners.^®
More recently, national Republicans perceived the 1982 amendment
to the Voting Rights Act as a chance to work with Southern legislatures to
create majority-minority congressional districts. Republican strategists
hoped that these new so-called safe districts would drain other districts of
enough reliably Democratic black voters to increase Republican represen
tation in the House of Representatives. Indeed, regaining control of the
House was a vital strategic goal for Republicans, given the unhappy
anomaly—for them, at least—of four decades of Democratic dominance
there. Whether in fact the Republican strategy succeeded as intended in
1994—when Republicans regained the House with the help of the
On windows of policymaking opportunity, cf. John T. S. Keeler, “Opening the Window
for Reform: Mandates, Crises, and Extraordinary Policy-Making,” Comparative Politi
cal Studies 25 (January 1993): 433-86.
On the increased liberalism of Southern Democrats, see James M. Glaser, Race, Cam
paign Politics, & the Realignment in the South (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1996). For the consequences for the House of Representatives and the Senate, see David
W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1991). On Southern Republicans, cf. Earl Black and Merle Black, The Vital South:
How Presidents Are Elected (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992);
Glaser, Race, Campaign Politics; and Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, Divided
by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1996), esp. chap. 8.
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South—is sharply debated, but there is no need to settle that debate here.
My point is simply that the Voting Rights Act amendment of 1982 even
tually stimulated party-building efforts by Republicans.^^
In other words, both of the major parties have important stakes in
voting-rights policy, and neither has sought extensively to revise the regu
latory framework established in 1965. The result? Voting-rights policy
and politics look like a subsystem. Groups and lawyers affiliated with
groups, most of them private or nonprofit, do almost all the work of
shaping voting-rights law and policy. Government lawyers initiate only a
very small percentage of cases—one estimate is 5 percent. As Gregory
Caldeira puts it, “Enforcement of voting rights is . . . very much an activ
ity of the private sector.Yet if both political parties are major (if lowprofile) stakeholders in the act, then voting-rights politics is not really a
policy subsystem operating largely out of view.
Indeed, subgovernments are ubiquitous in American politics, for at
least three reasons:
1.
2.
3.

American political parties cannot possibly place every policy issue and
domain on the national party system’s agenda for electoral contestation.
Countervailing power in the group system is always distributed very un
evenly.
Regulatory bureaucracy is essential to modern government.

Notwithstanding the inevitable ubiquity of subgovernments, votingrights policymaking is not part of this universe. It comprises, in sharp
The marginal impact of this strategy—whose existence no one disputes—is open to argu
ment. David Lublin suggests that the strategy’s political repercussions have been gen
uinely consequential. See David Ian Lublin, “Race, Representation, and Redistricting,”
in Peterson, Classifying by Race, 111-25, and Lublin, The Paradox of Representation:
Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress (Princeton; Princeton Univer
sity Press, 1997). A far more skeptical view can be found in Pamela S. Karlan, “Loss and
Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of the Century,” Vanderbilt Law Review 50
(March 1997): 291-326, and Karlan, “Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in
the Post-Shaw Era,” Cumberland Law Review 26: 2 (1995-96): 287-312. An analysis
that would also yield skepticism is J. Morgan Kousser, “Shaw v. Reno and the Real World
of Redistricting and Representation,” California Institute of Technology, Division of the
Humanities and Social Sciences, Social Science Working Paper 915, February 1995; this
work is rich with lessons about voting-rights politics since 1965. Other useful works are
Michael Kelly, “Segregation Anxiety,” The New Yorker (November 20, 1995): 43-54;
John R. Petrocik and Scott W. Desposato, “The Partisan Consequences of MajorityMinority Redistricting in the South, 1992 and 1994,” paper prepared for presentation at
the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago Hilton and
Towers, August 31-September 3, 1995; Carol Swain, “The Future of Black Representa
tion,” The American Prospect (Fall 1995): 78-83.
Gregory A. Caldeira, “Litigation, Lobbying, and Voting Rights Law,” in Grofman and
Davidson, Controversies in Minority Voting, 230-57.
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contrast, (1) legal struggle, (2) judicial governance, constrained by norms
of statutory and constitutional interpretation and conducted on the basis
of open, high-profile argument, and (3) the partisan use of strategic op
portunities provided by the Voting Rights Act.
The regulatory-mischief view obviously provides valuable cautionary
analysis, and it does so from within a rich analytical tradition.^^ But a
fair-minded reading of what has happened since 1965 in Southern local
government requires bringing legal mobilization and political parties into
a discussion of voting-rights politics. Doing so strongly suggests that the
Voting Rights Act’s politics simply has not engendered democratic
pathologies.
There is more, as it happens, to bring in besides legal mobilization and
political parties. Let us turn to a closer focus on a cluster of three topics:
(1) the character of local government, (2) enfranchisement as a two-stage
process, and (3) interactions between enfranchisement and local govern
mental renewal.
Ill: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LOCAL CITIZENSHIP AND
OFFICEHOLDING

The positive case for the role of the Voting Rights Act in Southern local
government hinges on appreciating (1) the value of local government in
democratic theory and relatedly (2) fair access to the political good of of
ficeholding.
Autonomous local government is a democratic resource. Its worth to
democracy comes in part from simple arithmetic: Given that the ratio of
local offices to numbers of citizens in a local jurisdiction is much closer to
unity than it is for other governmental levels, there are more possibilities
for citizens to engage in governance—and more possibilities for citizens
to have some personal knowledge of those who engage in governance.
More citizens will either cross (or know people who cross) the line be
tween the public and private domains and back.
Such line-crossing can reinforce people’s awareness that government is
a public enterprise (at least in principle) and ought not be the creature of
any group or organized interest.^"* The relatively enlarged ratio of offices
A book suggesting why this is a rich analytical tradition is James A. Morone, The Demo
cratic Wish: Popular Participation and the Limits of American Government (New York:
Basic Books, 1990).
Cf. Richard M. Valelly, “Public Policy for Reconnected Citizenship,” in Ingram and
Smith, Public Policy for Democracy, 241-66, discussion at 244.
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to voters at the local level creates the possibility that—to paraphrase Aris
totle—many citizens will rule and be ruled in turn.
Of course, one would not want to overstate this point about the possi
bilities of local government. The constant probability of citizens crossing
between public and private domains will be greater if local governmental
offices are vigorously contested. Yet such robust conflict may not exist.
On some accounts, it is less likely to exist at the local level because the
policy responsibilities of local governments pale in comparison with
those of state governments—and particularly national government.
Speaking before a county commission or a borough council is, after all, a
much different “line-crossing” experience than giving congressional testi
mony or stepping up to the lectern to deliver an oral argument before the
Supreme Court. Therefore the strength and number of moral or simply
architectural reminders of being in the public domain differ at the level of
county and local government.^^
Few people, however, can give congressional testimony about social
policy; many more can speak before their borough council about fire, san
itation, police, or recreational services. Relatively few people can serve in
national or state office; relatively more can serve on school boards, town
and city councils, and county commissions and assemblies.
Local governmental citizenship and officeholding can therefore leaven
our politics with broadly diffused knowledge of government and political
association. Notice, though, that the possibility for such leavening criti
cally depends on local governments’ being public: They and their offices
cannot belong to one group and not others. Otherwise there is no “line”
between the public and private domains whose crossing subtly instructs
local citizens and officeholders in government and political association.
For local governments to perform their leavening function, they cannot—
any more than governments at other levels—be openly biased in favor of
one set of people.
Southern local government during the era of Jim Crow manifestly did
not fill the bill. It was white government—the blacker the county or town,
the dimmer the line between the public and private domains.^^ This
brings up the value of fair access to political office.
Paul E. Peterson, City Limits (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1981); Steven Kelman. Making Public Policy: A Hopeful View of American Government (New York: Ba
sic Books, 1987).
Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation.
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The political good of officeholding

Voting Rights Act politics is an interesting case of enfranchisement and
officeholding among the enfranchised. But what happens when there is
enfranchisement without officeholding? Women’s suffrage in America
suggests an unfortunate answer.
The Nineteenth Amendment established female suffrage nationwide;
in the absence of rapid gains in female officeholding, however, it shaped
the national agenda only gradually. Another critically important factor
was the collapse in the amendment’s aftermath of the dense infrastructure
of women’s suffrage organizations, leaving no associations dedicated to
mobilizing women as women or to producing viable female candidates
for office. Not until rates of female officeholding began to increase in the
1970s—half a century later—did a pronounced women’s-issues legisla
tive agenda emerge. Enfranchisement without officeholding and the sur
vival of mobilizing organizations appears, on the basis of the women’s
suffrage case, to engender weak representation.^^
With weak representation, there is also what I call the problem of lin
gering doubt: If the newly enfranchised are not fit for the responsibilities
of public office why should they be fit for the other obligations and re
wards of citizenship? Enfranchisement always occurs in a context of some
hesitation. Invidious stereotypes long buttressed the barriers to full citi
zenship. Without new forms of officeholding, such stereotypes may not
dissipate, tainting the well of democratic change. Thus as late as 1972,
about half the electorate agreed with the statement that “Women should
take care of running their homes and leave running the country up to
men,” and 63 percent agreed that “Most men are better suited emotionCf. Barbara C. Burrell, A ^ontun’s Place Is in the House: Campaigning for Congress in
the Feminist Era (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994) and Anne
Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion; A Political Process Interpretation of the Women’s
Movement (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992). For an explanation of the
collapse of women’s organizations after the Nineteenth Amendment, see Anna Harvey,
“The Political Consequences of Suffrage Exclusion: Organizations, Institutions, and the
Electoral Mobilization of Women,” Social Science History 20 (Spring 1996): 97-132.
This is not to say that the culmination in 1920 of the struggle for female suffrage had no
policy effects. See Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins
of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Uni
versity Press, 1992), esp. part 3. See also Kristi Andersen, After Suffrage: Women in Par
tisan and Electoral Politics Before the New Deal (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1996). On “weak representation,” see Ira Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities: Race,
Politics, and Migration in the United States, 1900-30, and Britain, 1948-68 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1976), 23-8.
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ally for politics than are most women.” Like all survey responses, these
are not unambiguously clear, and their interpretation raises new ques
tions. But it would be hard to say that they fulfilled the expectations of
those who had pushed for women’s suffrage.^*
We now have several related propositions. The first is that local govern
ment’s ratio of offices to citizens makes it a potential school of democra
cy. Second, local government can enrich the enfranchisement process,
since officeholding and the character of representation are no small mat
ters for the quality of enfranchisement. Third, and implicit in the analysis
so far, nationally sponsored enfranchisement can strengthen the demo
cratic contributions of local government. With these propositions in mind,
a comparison of the first and second Reconstruction periods is in order.
The two reconstructions of Southern local government

From 1867 to 1877, about two thousand black men served as federal,
state, and local officeholders in the ex-Confederate states subject to con
gressional Reconstruction. They were all undoubtedly strongly Republi
can. In Eric Foner’s survey of these officeholders, using secondary work,
the U.S. Census, and the Los Angeles Genealogical Library of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, he assembled a census of 1,465 of
ficeholders. Foner omitted several hundred possible entries because the
data were too sparse, but almost all of these were local officeholders. Of
his sample, 78 percent were elected or appointed local officeholders. Thus
the vast majority of all black officeholders were local officeholders, occu
pying offices as diverse as boards of education, city councils, mayoralties,
county commissions, magistracies, and streetcar commissions. They were
concentrated in Deep South states with majority black or significantly
black populations: South Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, North Caroli
na, Alabama, and Georgia, in that order. In all, Foner found 56 kinds of
local officeholding. Some 20 percent of the total were justices of the
peace, 11 percent were city council members, 9 percent were county com
missioners, 7 percent were registrars, 6 percent were members of boards
of education, 5 percent were police officers, and 4 percent were localelections officials.
Burrell, A Woman’s Place, 15.
This account for Reconstruction and after relies heavily on evidence (and my calculations
from that evidence) in Eric Foner, Freedom's Lawmakers: A Directory of Black Office
holders during Reconstruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), ix-xxv.
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For black officeholders such as James K. Green, an Alabama state
politician, their service seems to have had enormous symbolic impor
tance:
I believe that the colored people have done well, considering all their circum
stances and surroundings, as emancipation made them. I for one was entirely ig
norant; I knew nothing more than to obey my master; and there were thousands
of us in the same attitude . . . but the tocsin of freedom sounded and knocked at
the door and we walked out like free men and met the exigencies as they grew up,
and shouldered the responsibilities.^®

From the perspective of the democratic theory sketched above, the dra
ma of answering the “tocsin of freedom” takes on considerable meaning.
Men risked their lives and livelihoods in many places, yet turnover among
officeholders was high, in part to accommodate a demand for officehold
ing. Local black citizens had unusually high expectations of the impor
tance of local office, bringing all manner of problems before local black
officials. Local government, thanks to national intervention, was a school
of democracy.
Nonetheless, most local officeholders during Reconstruction were
white. What, therefore, was local democracy like in those places where
white Republicans largely governed, but in a context of robust black associationalism.^^^ Historian Donald Nieman has recovered the fascinat
ing story of Washington County, Texas, midway between Houston and
Austin. It is probably representative of many (if only a minority of)
Southern counties.
Consistent with other scholarship, Nieman shows that a vibrant black
politics at the local level meant public employment for freedmen, exem
plifying one of many labor-market alternatives that emerged with the colFoner, Freedom’s Lawmakers, s.v. James K. Green, 90-1.
Here 1 am adding a third case to my account of enfranchisement-as-process; To the cases
of enfranchisement with and without officeholding, I add enfranchisement with some of
ficeholding in a context of robust associationalism among the enfranchised. As Anna
Harvey shows in “The Political Consequences of Suffrage Exclusion,” women’s associa
tions largely collapsed after the Nineteenth Amendment. Black associationalism during
Reconstruction, by contrast, was vibrant, partly because no black associations existed
before the Civil War amendments; thus there was no issue of negotiating the transition to
a new political context, as there was for women’s associations.
On white officeholding, see Randolph B. Campbell, “Grass Roots Reconstruction: The
Personnel of County Government in Texas, 1865-1876,” Journal of Southern History 58
(February 1992): 99—116; Donald G. Nieman, “African Americans and the Meaning of
Freedom: Washington County, Texas, as a Case Study, 1865-1886,” Chicago-Kent Law
Review 70:2 (1994): 541-82. Representativeness of Washington County discussed in email message, “Washington County,” Donald Nieman to Richard Valelly, July 31, 1996,
hard copy in possession of author (message cited with permission of Donald Nieman).
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lapse of slavery. Republican officeholders also established outdoor poor
relief for black as well as white citizens. Here they innovated in a way that
Democrats promptly reversed when they gained office. Rather than re
quire residence at a county poor farm, Washington County Republicans
gave monthly payments to the aged and infirm and to widows and or
phans requiring help.
It is in discussing the transformation of the local criminal-justice sys
tem that Nieman breaks new ground. Between 1870 and 1876, the state
district court and the county sheriff selected jurors from the registeredvoter list. Rates of African-American jury service were high: About onethird of the jurors who served on 107 petit juries were black, while 40 to
50 percent of grand juries were black. Although the state legislature acted
in 1876 to curb black jury service, about a quarter of both petit and grand
jurors in Washington County were black until 1884—at which time Dem
ocrats violently crushed the local Republican party.
These juries consistently indicted blacks for property crimes at higher
rates than for whites, but not at the punitively high rates typical of local
justice where there was no African-American jury service. Evidently they
did so because black property crime occurred at a higher rate. Also, for
the period 1870-4, juries indicted blacks for crimes against the person at
higher rates. Rates of conviction and the severity of punishment for
black-on-black murder were also higher than for white-on-white murder.
Black jurors were apparently determined to stop black-on-black crime;
white jurors may have been more sanguine about private violence, and
thus pushed for milder punishments of white-on-white murder.
Here Nieman’s historiography suggests an intricate insight into the
possibilities of local government. Through their determination and suc
cess in addressing black crime, black jurors constructed a new moral or
der in a post-Emancipation South riddled with deep conflicts over how to
cope with old and new forms of violence. This may be one of the reasons
why court was generally well attended by both black and white citizens.
Many whites preferred malign neglect of black-on-black crime. Indeed,
the local white press complained about Washington County’s success in
coping with black-on-black crime, finding it financially burdensome. But
having constructed their own churches, schools, and communities in
Emancipation’s aftermath, African-American leaders and citizens clearly
intended to keep those institutions as free from social disorder as they
could. The case of Washington County indicates that local government
during Reconstruction could be a very special school of democracy in
deed.
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What about the Second Reconstruction of local Southern government?
No study that matches the rich depth of Nieman’s is yet available. Still,
the evidence so far about local black officeholding yields several conclu
sions.^^
First, black officeholding is symbolically quite important. As a con
temporary South Carolina official has said, “There’s an inherent value in
officeholding that goes far beyond picking up the garbage. A race of peo
ple who are excluded from public office will always be second class.”^"^
Second, black officeholding has often stimulated black voter interest in
local government (though less so in rural Deep South counties). It has also
unsurprisingly led to conflicts over what black officeholders can and
should do, thus heightening political factionalism among black Southern
communities.
Third, although racially polarized voting persists, it is worth looking
past the statistical indicators to note that fairly large numbers of whites
vote for black candidates. Relatively speaking, few do; in absolute terms,
however, many do.
Fourth, local services involving municipal construction and road ser
vice have become more equally distributed within local jurisdictions.
More police and fire protection has been extended to black neighbor
hoods. But redistributing municipal or county jobs to blacks—other than
the menial labor to which Jim Crow historically relegated them—has, not
surprisingly, been much more difficult and controversial. Finally, local
governments have more actively sought state or federal assistance that
will benefit both black and white citizens.
On my reading, all of this counts as renewal—a rebrightening of the
line between the public and private domains. It is impossible, of course,
for local government to hold quite the same attraction for local citizens as
it did during Reconstruction, despite the suggestion in survey results that
” The only two lengthy and systematic studies available are James W. Button, Blacks and
Social Change: Impact of the Civil Rights Movement in Southern Communities (Prince
ton: Princeton University Press, 1989) and Lawrence J. Hanks, The Struggle for Black
Political Empowerment in Three Georgia Counties (Knoxville: University of Tennessee
Press, 1987). Out of the fairly well-developed journal literature, I found a recent study of
a Deep South county quite worthwhile: Pildes and Donoghue, “Cumulative Voting in the
United States” (which ought actually to be titled “Cumulative Voting in Chilton County,
Alabama, since 1988”). An overlooked but valuable treatment that manages to make is
sues and debates in the scholarly literature come alive is “Hands That Picked Cotton:
Black Politics in Today’s Rural South,” a documentary comparing local governmental
electioneering and representation in rural black-belt Mississippi and small-town blackbelt Louisiana; this 60-minute video, released in 1982, was directed by Alan Bell and Paul
Stekler.
Grofman and Davidson, Quiet Revolution, 16.
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Americans cherish this level of government more than all others. Nation
al and state governments now do much more. Also, local voting differs. In
the nineteenth century, it occurred in the open, in front of one’s peers.
One asked for a party ballot in plain sight of a neighbor or a former over
seer. Local voting is much less stressful now, but it is also less publicly
meaningful—an affair conducted at the end of a workday, in secret and in
silence in a booth, somewhere in a school auditorium.
But the disappointment among black voters in the possibilities of local
government speaks volumes about how they once prospectively valued—
and still implicitly value—local government. White voters and local lead
ers often seem unhappy about the particulars of voting-rights implemen
tation. But there is scattered survey and anecdotal evidence suggesting
overall white support for how the Voting Rights Act has influenced local
government. At any rate, the resistance, discomfort, and adjustment of
whites to local black political influence are marks of local government’s
value to whites—otherwise, there would be sheer indifference.^^
It is far from clear just how the contemporary situation will evolve. Ac
counts by participants in the post-1965 legal mobilization show that the
overall experience was one of relative success for them. The periodization
and characterization provided in Table 10.1 underscore this point. On the
other hand, there is some evidence that state and local barriers to repre
sentation may now be able to survive, or even reemerge, because of the
Supreme Court’s hostility to race-conscious remedies for vote dilution.^^
One hopes that such a danger is not realized. Local government can
teach the arts of citizenship and government more readily to more people
than other levels of government. But it must be public and socially neutral
government. The reconstruction of Southern local government restores
such necessary features. Given the political instruction provided by open
ly and publicly taming social frictions. Southern local governments may
actually be better schools of local democracy than many non-Southern
counties.
In addition to Pildes and Donoghue, “Cumulative Voting,” see Parker, Black Votes
Count, 202—4 (though Parker finds the evidence less reassuring than others might).
Worry about the future can be found in Jacqueline A. Berrien, “All Politics Are Local:
The Extension of Shaw v. Reno to Local Election Systems,” Voting Rights Review (Vot
ing Rights Program of the Southern Regional Council, Summer 1997, 14-17. See also
Selwyn Carter, “Justice, Section 5 Targeted; Limits on Race Cost Minority State Seats,”
Voting Rights Review, Summer 1996, 15-20. Some of the context for this worry can
be explored in Saul Brenner and Harold J. Spaeth, Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of
Precedent on the Supreme Court, 1946-1992 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995).
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IV: A DEMOCRATIC AUDIT

This chapter has closely considered what would seem to be an open-andshut view of the Voting Rights Act, namely, that it is a powerful (perhaps
too-powerful) engine of delocalization. This view has found support
among the Supreme Court’s majority in voting-rights cases. If one were to
imagine what might be called an audit of the Voting Rights Act’s politics,
the regulatory-mischief view would advise entry of such debits as private
government, subsequent misunderstanding of the democratic process,
and substantial federalism costs.
Yet is it clear that those items must be placed in the debit column? The
major parties, as well as groups, quietly implement the Fifteenth Amend
ment. Also, the voting-rights policy domain is hardly shielded from pub
lic scrutiny and discussion. In fact, it is in part an arena of democratic
struggle.
Through such struggle there has been a renewal of Southern local gov
ernment. In this respect, the Voting Rights Act opts for both nationalism
and localism. Local governments have to be moderately neutral and de
cently unbiased for them to enrich American citizenship. For more than
half a century. Southern local governments did not serve the purpose;
only in the last decade, really, have they again begun to do so. The truth is
that the Voting Rights Act is a windfall for Southern local government.
Enter into the credit column, then, the rejuvenation of a kind of local cit
izenship and officeholding that existed all too briefly during Reconstruc
tion and that betokens the promise of American democratic life.

